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Liquidity Effects of the 
Events of September 11, 2001 
n the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
 Federal Reserve supplied funds to the banking system in 
unprecedented amounts. The destructive force of the attacks 
themselves caused severe disruptions to the U.S. banking 
system, particularly in banks’ abilities to send payments. The 
physical disruptions caused by the attacks included outages of 
telephone switching equipment in Lower Manhattan’s 
financial district, impaired records processing and communi-
cations systems at individual banks, the evacuation of buildings 
that were the sites for the payments operations of large banks, 
and the suspended delivery of checks by air couriers. 
These disruptions left some banks unable to execute 
payments to other banks through the Federal Reserve System’s 
large-value payments system, Fedwire, which in turn resulted 
in an unexpected shortfall for other banks. Banks rely heavily 
on incoming funds to make their payments, so these 
unexpected shortfalls affected the distribution of balances 
across the banking system. The disruptions to the 
communications infrastructure also made it harder for banks 
to redistribute balances across the banking system in a timely 
manner. Accordingly, the actions of the Federal Reserve System 
were intended to counteract the effects of the unusual 
distribution of liquidity and the difficulties experienced by 
the banking system in distributing liquidity directly. 
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• On September 11, banks experienced 
difficulties in making their payments because 
of widespread damage to property and 
communications systems in Lower 
Manhattan. As a result, other banks received 
fewer payments than were expected. 
• Since banks rely heavily on incoming funds
to make their own payments, the normal 
coordination of payments broke down, and 
liquidity shortages developed at many banks.
• The Federal Reserve responded by supplying 
abundant liquidity to the banking system 
through discount window loans and open 
market operations—actions that helped 
restore payments coordination.
• The episode highlighted the usefulness
of the discount window and of intraday 
lending by the central bank as tools for 
managing marketwide demands for liquidity.
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The direct effects of the unusual distribution of balances and 
the difficulty of redistributing them resulted in a less regular 
flow of payments by banks to other banks. A disrupted and thus 
less coordinated payments flow can be thought of as a sudden 
drop in the velocity of high-powered money—that is, balances 
at the Federal Reserve. In the U.S. fractional reserve banking 
system, banks in aggregate regularly make payments that 
exceed their deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks by a factor of 
more than 100. To attain such a highly efficient utilization of 
balances requires a robust interbank money market as well as 
intricately harmonized timing and regularity in banks’ 
payments activity. The sudden disorder in the regular timing of 
incoming payments made planning for a bank’s liquidity needs 
more difficult. While some banks that experienced 
technological difficulties in sending payments accumulated 
higher-than-desired balances, other banks’ increased 
uncertainty (regarding which payments they might receive 
later in the day) led them to have higher precautionary demand 
for liquid balances. Consequently, the sources of liquidity 
internal to the banking system were not available or capable of 
addressing the widespread demand for liquidity.
The demand for such large amounts of liquidity by U.S. 
banks in this episode might seem somewhat puzzling at first 
glance. Typically, students of banking history point to bank 
runs as examples of extraordinary demand for liquidity. 
However, there were no runs on banks in the United States 
following September 11. Nor were there extraordinary 
demands for currency by banks or by the public. Furthermore, 
the incident that triggered the liquidity shortfall was well 
known to all market participants and was not generally 
believed to cause any bank’s credit quality or solvency to 
deteriorate significantly. Instead, the events drew further 
attention to the high level of interdependencies present in 
payments flows. 
Given these interdependencies, the provision of liquidity by 
the Federal Reserve System allowed banks to make payments 
while being assured that funds would be available at the end of 
the day. This assurance helped banks resume their normal 
payments activities, which in turn increased the circulation of 
liquidity through the normal channels. In addition, in the 
aftermath of the attacks, banks and their customers engaged in 
extraordinary cooperative efforts to overcome the problems 
caused by the destruction of infrastructure and its attendant 
effects. (A review of many of these efforts is provided in Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York [2002].)
In this article, we provide new evidence of the importance of 
the coordination mechanism that banks use in their normal 
payments activity to provide liquidity. We do so by first 
outlining the sources of funding for banks’ payments activity, 
thus highlighting the role of expected incoming payments from 
other banks. Next, we examine the disruptions in the payments 
and communications mechanisms on September 11 and the 
disorder that resulted from those disruptions. We then directly 
estimate banks’ payments reactions to the receipt of payments 
from other banks and how their reactions changed in the days 
following the attacks. Finally, we discuss possible alternative 
ways to avoid such large disruptions to the payments 
mechanism, as well as ways to settle payments and the potential 
of these ways to reduce liquidity demands in the event of a 
significant disruption to the payments mechanism.
Sources of Liquidity for Payments: 
The Strategic Dimension 
Banks must have enough liquidity to cover the amount of their 
payments made over Fedwire.1 This liquidity typically consists 
of : 1) balances maintained on account with the central bank, 
2) borrowing from other banks through the money markets, 
3) credit extensions from the central bank, and 4) expected 
incoming transfers from other banks.2 The last category creates 
a strategic challenge for banks in their liquidity management: 
they each rely on one another’s payments as a source of 
funding.
The first source of funds available for making a payment is 
the balances kept on account at Federal Reserve Banks. For 
commercial banks, these balances consist of either required 
reserve balances, excess reserve balances, or service-related 
balances.3 These balances and service-related balances for 
August 2001 averaged $14.65 billion per day.4 Banks are 
required to maintain these balances at a certain level during 
two-week periods known as reserve maintenance periods. In 
addition, the Federal Reserve can supply funds to the banking 
market through open market operations. By purchasing 
securities, the Federal Reserve directly increases banks’ 
balances held on account at System Banks.
Overnight balances at the Federal Reserve are costly to 
maintain because they do not earn interest.5 Nevertheless, if 
banks’ balances fall below the target on average for the two-
week period, the banks face a penalty rate and must hold a 
higher level of balances during the next two-week period. In 
addition, if banks fall into overdraft positions on any given 
night, they must pay a substantial penalty of 4 percentage 
points in excess of the effective federal funds rate for that day. 
As a result of these disincentives to falling short of required 
balances and to holding excessive balances, banks try to target 
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If a bank’s payments over the course of the day exceed its 
receipts by more than the value of the balances with which it 
started the day, a bank can borrow funds in the federal funds 
market. Federal funds activity averaged $144 billion per day in 
the first quarter of 1998 (Furfine 1999).6 Fed funds activity 
redistributes the liquidity among banks but does not add to the 
approximately $15 billion in deposits in the Federal Reserve 
System. The Federal Reserve can increase the deposit level by 
lending funds through the discount window,7 where 
borrowing averaged only $174 million per day in August 2001.8 
Using the fed funds market and the discount window as 
sources of funding comes at a cost. Fed funds purchases are 
uncollateralized borrowing from other commercial banks, and 
the borrower pays the going fed funds rate to compensate the 
lender for the risk involved. Loans from the discount window 
are made at the discount rate, which is generally lower than the 
fed funds target rate. However, banks are not expected to rely 
on the discount window for funds on a regular basis.9
Intraday credit from the Federal Reserve System provides 
another source of funding for banks’ payments.10 Coleman 
(2002) reports that the average value of daylight overdrafts, as 
this form of intraday credit is called, was $32.8 billion per day 
in August 2001. However, banks tend to economize on this 
source of funding because the Federal Reserve System charges 
banks a fee for daylight overdrafts above a certain amount. 
In general, the daily value of banks’ payments greatly exceeds 
the value of those sources of liquidity. Consider that during 
August 2001, the value of Fedwire funds transfers averaged more 
than $1.6 trillion per day, while banks held about $15 billion on 
account.11 In other words, the “turnover” of each dollar on 
banks’ balances was more than 100 (if security transfers are 
included, the turnover ratio is about 180).12 Banks can make 
payments even though the value of those payments is consider-
ably higher than the value of the sources of funds because most 
payments are offset over the course of the day. Most banks can 
expect that they will receive a certain value of incoming 
payments during the day. To some extent, a bank can use these 
expected receipts to plan its submission of payments over 
Fedwire throughout the day. Of course, other banks are planning 
to use incoming funds to make payments as well, so how can 
banks in aggregate use expected receipts as a source of funding? 
The Strategy of Payments 
Coordination
Banks use their scarce liquidity to serve both their customers’ 
payments needs and to complete their own agreed-upon 
payments arising from trading activities and interbank lending. 
As we noted, banks attempt to make use of incoming funds 
received from other banks by strategically timing payments.13 
In models of this strategic payments behavior, banks make 
payments in reaction to their receipts from other banks. Each 
bank behaves by choosing the best reaction available to it, given 
its receipts. A bank’s “reaction function” describes how a bank 
responds to payments received.
In general, we can identify at least two ways in which the 
receipt of a payment by a bank can increase the likelihood of 
that bank making a payment. First, the receipt of the funds 
replenishes the bank’s balances at the central bank. Given that 
the bank has a list of payments it wishes to make during the day, 
the receipt of funds allows the bank to make an outgoing 
payment with less chance of incurring an overdraft in its 
account, all else being equal. In other words, some payments 
activity can be “self-funded” by matching outgoing payments 
to incoming payments. Second, as a payment is received on 
behalf of a customer, that customer is subsequently more 
creditworthy. If the customer had been at its credit limit prior 
to the receipt of payment, the receipt into its account relaxes 
the credit constraint of the customer. The customer’s sub-
sequent requests to the bank to make payments on its behalf 
will not be delayed as a result of the customer’s credit exposure 
to the bank.
Exhibit 1 shows, for simplicity, the activity of a payments 
system in which only two banks participate. The horizontal axis 
shows payments sent by Bank A and the vertical axis shows 
payments received by Bank A, and vice versa for Bank B. Two 
sets of reaction functions are shown. A reaction function shows 
Exhibit 1
Payments Reaction Curves and Equilibrium
Bank B’s payments sent, Bank A’s payments received
Bank A’s payments sent,
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the level of a bank’s payments as a function of its expected 
receipts over some period of time. This function can be 
represented by the algebraic relationship  , 
where   is Bank A’s payments in time t,   represents  the 
receipts of Bank A at time t (both expressed in dollar values), 
a is the bank’s autonomous willingness to send payments 
(irrespective of its receipts), and the parameter b represents the 
slope of the reaction function.   is an error term at time t.
The solid-line reaction curves in the exhibit show the banks 
sending payments without considering their receipts. The 
reaction curves have a slope of zero with respect to the receipts 
from their counterparties (in the case of Bank A, its reaction 
curve is vertical with respect to the horizontal axis, but has a 
zero slope with respect to its receipts, which are shown on the 
vertical axis). The intercepts show the autonomous willingness 
of each bank to make payments and are functions of each 
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bank’s balances on deposit at the central bank. The equilibrium 
of payments occurs at the intersection of the two reaction 
curves, labeled E. In contrast, the dashed-line reaction curves 
have a positive slope with respect to the receipts from the 
banks’ counterparties, reflecting “strategic complement-
arity.”14 For these reaction curves, the equilibrium occurs at 
the point labeled  . The positively sloped reaction curves—or 
strategic complementarity—are significant because they show 
that in equilibrium, the banks can make more payments per 
dollar of balances. This is the case because at  , banks conduct 
more payments starting from the same level of bank deposits at 
the central bank (the intercepts being the same for both sets of 
reaction functions). It is in this sense that payments are 
coordinated in equilibrium. The lower the level of coordi-
nation—or the closer the slopes of the reaction curves are to 
zero—the greater a bank’s balances at the central bank must
be for that bank to make a given value of payments. 
(Later in this article, we confirm that the slopes of banks’ 




One way that the banking system can coordinate payments 
and use expected incoming funds as a source of liquidity (in a 
real-time gross settlement system) in equilibrium is by sub-
mitting payments simultaneously, or almost simul-
taneously.15,16 In the Fedwire funds transfer service, banks 
typically send the bulk of their daily payments between 
3:30 p.m. and 5:30 p.m., and this pattern is very stable. In that 
way, banks recirculate liquidity very quickly and take 
advantage of offsetting payments without incurring daylight 
overdrafts for an extended period of time. 
Another strategic element in making payments (in an RTGS 
system) is the risk to which a bank is subject when paying out 
funds in advance of receiving funds from a counterparty.17
A perceived increase in this risk can result in banks delaying the 
submission of their payments while they await the arrival of 
payments from counterparties.18 The actions of a central bank 
cannot directly reduce this risk, but they can weaken the 
spillover effect of this risk on banks’ willingness to send 
payments to third-party banks. Under normal circumstances, 
this risk is relatively low, but in the days following September 11, 
the risk may have affected banks’ willingness to submit 
payments in a timely manner, notwithstanding the pledge of 
the Federal Reserve System to provide low-cost liquidity to the 
banks.
Example of a Coordination Failure
If a bank fails to make an expected payment, the ability of other 
banks to make payments can be disrupted in that they send 
fewer payments, which results in fewer receipts by their 
counterparties, thus creating a downward cycle.
Consider the following example of three banks, each of 
which has to pay one of the other banks once during the day. 
Assume overdrafts are not allowed. Exhibit 2 illustrates the 
situation. Suppose that under normal circumstances, Bank A 
pays Bank B every morning. Bank B, using funds transferred 
from Bank A, pays Bank C; then Bank C can pay Bank A. 
However, if Bank B fails to pay Bank C, then Bank C cannot 
pay Bank A. Bank B accumulates deposits at the Federal 
Reserve as its “due froms” are paid to it by a Fedwire transfer, 
while Bank A and Bank C together have reduced deposits at the 
Federal Reserve but have not reduced their “due froms.” Thus, 
the inability of a bank to send out payments causes that bank’s 
deposits to pile up and reduces the ability of other banks to 
send funds.
One measure of concentration in banks’ balances at the 
central bank is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI).19
One way that the banking system can 
coordinate payments and use expected 
incoming funds as a source of liquidity 
(in a real-time gross settlement system) 
in equilibrium is by submitting payments 
simultaneously, or almost simultaneously. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 63
As shown in Exhibit 2, the concentration level in deposits at the 
central bank rises considerably when the expected payment 
from Bank B is not made (from either the opening level of 
balances or from expected end-of-day balances), leaving 
Bank A and Bank C unable to make payments. 
A measure of liquidity usage is provided by the system’s 
turnover ratio—the ratio of the value of total payments made to 
total deposits. In the exhibit, the turnover ratio falls from 1.75 
to 0.5. The lower turnover ratio shows that the payments made 
are more costly in terms of bank balances, which indicates an 
increase in the demand for liquidity per dollar of payments.
Another measure of liquidity is the netting ratio. This is the 
ratio of the day’s total payments to the amount of funds that 
would need to be transferred between accounts if only the net 
amounts flowing between banks were exchanged.20 In the 
exhibit, the netting ratio falls from 7 to 1 as the expected 
payment—and subsequent payments—fail to be made. The 
expected level of 7 shows that the banks would only need to 
hold $25 (to be held by Bank B) if they were to make all 
payments simultaneously (or transfer only net amounts) and 
still comply with the rules that their balances not fall below $0. 
The actual level of the netting achieved shows again that the 
Exhibit 2
Example of the Effects of One Bank’s Failure to Send Payments




Bank C: $0 Bank B: $50
$50 at
10:00 a.m.







after payments: Bank A: $50 Bank B: $25
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration of opening 
balances: 5,000; closing: 3,750; turnover ratio: 1.75; 
netting ratio: 7













after interruption: Bank A: $0 Bank B: $100
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration of balances
after payment interruption: 10,000; turnover ratio: 0.5;
netting ratio: 1
Assets and Liabilities of Banks at Opening of Day and after Bank B Fails to Pay Bank C
Bank A Bank B Bank C
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Opening
Balances at central 
bank: $50
Due to Bank B: $50
Balances at central 
bank: $50
Due to Bank C: $75
Balances at central 
bank: $0
Due to Bank A: 
$50
Due from Bank C: 
$50
Due from Bank A: 
$50
Due from Bank B: $75
Other Other Other Other Other Other
After interruption
  of payments
Balances at central 
bank: $0
Due to Bank B: $0
Balances at central 
bank: $100
Due to Bank C: $75
Balances at central 
bank: $0
Due to Bank A: 
$50
Due from Bank C: 
$50
Due from Bank B: $75
Other Other Other Other Other Other64 Liquidity Effects of the Events of September 11, 2001
actual payments are more costly than expected and—to the 
extent that banks wish to make payments—indicates that 
demand for liquidity rises.21
Bank C, if it still wishes to make the payment to Bank A (or 
if there are more “rounds” of payments to be made later in the 
day, or on the next day), can borrow funds on the interbank 
market or borrow from some other party, typically the central 
bank. In addition, the central bank can add reserves to the 
system through open market operations. 
If it were to borrow on the interbank market, from whom 
would Bank C borrow? Only Bank B has funds to lend. It might 
be the case that although Bank B cannot feasibly send the 
expected payment to Bank C, perhaps because communi-
cations with its customer are impaired, Bank B is able to lend 
to Bank C. In this case, there is an increase in demand for 
borrowing on the interbank market, and Bank B would lend 
more than usual in that market. The payment by Bank C to 
Bank A would be accomplished. If Bank B cannot easily make 
an interbank loan because of technical difficulties, then the 
central bank can inject reserves either through the discount 
window or open market operations. In either case, Bank C 
would make its payment, but, once again, the turnover ratio 
would fall. In this case, the turnover ratio falls not necessarily 
because payments values fall, but rather because the amount of 
reserves in the system needed to accomplish payment has risen.
The example illustrates the fragile nature of using payments 
coordination as a source of liquidity for banks. One bank’s 
failure to pay as expected because of a technological problem 
can be felt as a liquidity shortage by the bank’s counterparties, 
and their counterparties, making payments activity more costly.
Payments Disruptions Following 
September 11, 2001
After the attacks on the morning of September 11, it was 
immediately clear to financial market participants that general 
operations and communications and computer systems in 
Lower Manhattan were not functioning well.22 A direct effect 
of these difficulties was a reduction in the value and volume of 
transfers on Fedwire on September 11.23 Although there were 
major disruptions to markets during that week—the New York 
Stock Exchange was closed for four days and the commercial 
paper market was significantly disrupted—it is worth noting 
that settlements occurred at the major large-value private-
sector settlement systems (the Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation and the Clearing House Inter-bank Payments 
System [CHIPS]) on the eleventh and subsequent days.
Information on aggregate activity for the banking system on 
September 11 and the days surrounding it is presented in 
Table 1. The physical disruptions caused by the attacks are 
evident in the sharp drop in the volume of payments made on 
Fedwire. Furthermore, one can observe that the volume of 
payments remained low for the next two days as physical 
disruptions caused by the attacks continued to affect banks and 
their customers.
The value of funds sent on September 11 was $1.2 trillion, 
about three-fourths of the average for the benchmark period. 
However, unlike volume, the value of funds sent had returned 
to normal levels on the twelfth and was then at elevated levels 
for the next seven business days.
The aggregate balances of the banking system increased 
starting on September 12 and reached a peak of $121 billion on 
September 14. By Friday, September 21, balances returned to 
normal levels. Although the Federal Reserve System injected 
funds into the banking system in a number of ways, the pattern 
of an increase in balances is mainly explained by discount 
window loans and open market operations. Recall the turnover 
ratio, which is the ratio of the value of total payments made to 
total deposits. In our example, the turnover ratio fell as 
liquidity was not distributed as expected via the payments 
system. As we see in Table 1, the turnover ratio for Fedwire 
funds transfers fell from more than 100 before September 11 to 
only 18 on September 14, indicating a significant increase in 
the amount of liquidity used to make a dollar’s worth of 
payment. Once again, by the end of the next week, the turnover 
ratio was at normal levels.
Table 1
Fedwire Funds Transfer Value and Volume,
and Aggregate Opening Balances with the








September 10 436,312 1,591 13
September 11 249,472 1,216 13
September 12 332,433 1,696 44
September 13 376,937 1,952 104
September 14 423,256 2,009 121
September 17 462,522 2,312 111
September 18 419,126 1,978 46
September 19 401,420 1,836 19
September 20 433,771 1,921 15
September 21 442,293 1,832 13
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 65
Chart 1
Value and Volume of Funds Sent per Minute 
Ten-Minute Moving Average
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.






























We also examined two alternate estimates of fed funds 
activity during the period.24 These estimates indicate that some 
banks were unable to return funds on September 11 that they 
had borrowed on September 10, presumably because of the 
physical disruptions following the attacks. Furthermore, 
because of the physical disruptions, a smaller than average 
amount of fed funds was sent on September 11. For the next 
few days, however, fed funds activity was elevated as the Federal 
Reserve System implemented large open market operations. 
Although the values of Fedwire funds transfers and fed 
funds activity were quickly restored, the timing pattern of these 
payments was disturbed for a more extended period. As the day 
of September 11 progressed, it became clear to banks not 
directly affected by the problems in Lower Manhattan that both 
the level and timing of activity on Fedwire were significantly 
affected. Furthermore, banks that were directly affected were 
having difficulty sending out payments, communicating with 
customers, maintaining up-to-date records, and delivering 
securities.
Chart 1 compares the timing of payments on September 11 
with the average for the benchmark period (the benchmark 
period serves as our measure of normal payments activity and 
allows us to gauge the effects of the attacks).25 The top panel 
shows the value transferred per minute and the bottom panel 
shows the volume of payments transferred per minute. Both 
panels include a two-standard-deviation band around the 
benchmark period average to indicate the normal range of 
variability. As can be seen in Chart 1, another direct effect of 
the disruptions was a very different pattern of payments timing 
compared with the benchmark pattern. In particular, more 
than one-third of the value of payments was sent after the usual 
closing of Fedwire at 6:30 p.m. 66 Liquidity Effects of the Events of September 11, 2001
Chart 2
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for Start-of-Day 
Federal Reserve Balances, by Day






















Value-Weighted Average of the Timing of Payments on Fedwire
Benchmark Period and September 4-21, 2001
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
September 2001
Time (weighted average) Time (standard deviation)
Standard deviation
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Concentration in Bank Balances
Chart 2 shows the median and 95th percentile of the HHI of 
account balances (for opening balances) in the benchmark data 
set and for each of nine business days in the attack data set.26
It is clear that the concentration in account balances at the 
Federal Reserve—rising more than fourteen-fold from its 
normal levels on the days following the terrorist attacks—was 
a most unusual event. Furthermore, as we will show, this 
measure would be even higher if the Federal Reserve had not 
distributed funds from the discount window in the pattern 
it did.
Measures of Coordination Failures
Next, we examine two measures of the tendency of payments 
activity to be concentrated in a particular time during the day. 
Chart 3 shows the standard deviation of the timing of 
payments weighted by their value and the average time of 
payments, also weighted by value. The standard deviation 
measure indicates that the variability of payments timing rose 
precipitously—almost doubling to about four hours from 
two—indicating an unusual and disordered pattern of timing 
of payments relative to the benchmark period. In addition, 
payments were significantly delayed. This is shown by the 
value-weighted average of the time of payment on Fedwire, 
which was delayed by approximately two hours relative to its 
benchmark-period average.27 The same patterns are present in 
the estimates of fed funds activity as well; the borrowing and FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 67
Chart 4
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: The shaded band indicates +/- two standard deviations of the benchmark averages.
September 12, 2001 September 11, 2001
lending in the banking system’s internal market for distribu-
ting liquidity occurred later in the day and with a much more 
varied pattern during the remainder of the week. Both of these 
changes are highly significant relative to normal patterns. 
Another indication of the disorder in payments during 
those days was the decreased netting ratio of payments. Recall 
that the netting ratio is the ratio of the day’s total payments to 
the amount of funds that would need to be transferred between 
accounts if only the net amounts flowing between banks were 
exchanged. Chart 4 displays a related measure of netting. It 
shows the amounts of payments in terms of the percentage of 
the day’s total payments offset within each hour of the day. We 
shaded the area on the chart that represents the mean netting 
ratio plus or minus two standard deviations for each hour 
across the 107 days in the benchmark data set. It is clear that the 
fall in the concentration of payments was accompanied by a 
drop in the degree to which banks managed to arrange 
offsetting payments to be made at roughly the same time, 
particularly in the late afternoon period. Between 3:30 p.m. 
and 5:30 p.m., banks regularly offset about 20 percent of the 
day’s total payments per hour, and the values transferred per 
minute are usually the greatest. On the four days immediately 
following the attacks, offsetting payments made during those 
two hours fell to between 5 percent and 10 percent of the day’s 
total payments per hour. A day’s payments activity averaged 
$1.685 trillion in 2001, so a decline of 10 percentage points in 
offsetting payments during those two hours could result in an 
increased demand for liquidity of $163 billion, all else being 
equal. The coordination of payments timing is crucial in 
reducing the banks’ demand for liquidity. The value of intraday 
overdrafts on September 11-13 was much higher than usual 
because fewer offsetting payments were made.28
Payment Reaction Function Estimates
We estimate the reaction function of bank payments over 
Fedwire by measuring a bank’s own tendency to make 
outgoing payments as a function of its receipts. In the equation, 
we posit that a bank’s decision to send outgoing payments is 
dependent on the payments it receives from all other banks, as 
in the equation we described earlier,   (this 
formulation is similar to that of Bech and Garratt 
[forthcoming], who consider a two-agent game).29 By focusing 
on the slope coefficient b, we can judge how much strategic 
complementarity, shown by a positive slope, is present in 
banks’ payments timing strategies.
We estimate the reaction function by pooling the Fedwire 
activity of twenty large banks—whose payments activity 
accounts for more than 60 percent of Fedwire volume— 
together in a panel estimation with fixed effects (Table 2). In 
this panel approach to estimating the reaction function, a 
bank’s payments in a one-minute interval for each minute 
during the day are dependent on the bank’s receipts in the 
previous fifteen-minute interval, the bank’s opening balance, 
and the bank’s cumulative receipts minus its cumulative 
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payments sent up to sixteen minutes prior to the minute.30
In addition, we include dummy variables for the time period 
before 8:30 a.m., for the period between 6:00 p.m. and 
6:30 p.m., and for the tenth day of a reserve maintenance 
period.31 We perform another estimation including dummy 
variables for each half hour of the day between 2:00 p.m. and 
6:00 p.m. These latter time-of-day dummies are intended to 
capture any institutional regularity or very long-run patterns of 
coordination that are common across banks in their daily 
payments behavior that might contribute to the pronounced 
peak in payments in the afternoon (Table 2, panel A). We also 
include a bank-specific intercept (fixed effect) for each bank in 
both estimating equations.
The parameters of this equation are estimated under a Tobit 
assumption for the functional form. That is, we use the same 
equation, first to predict if a payment would be made in the 
relevant time interval, and then to predict the payment’s size if 
a payment is to be made. The results from estimating the 
coefficient on a bank’s receipts separately for each of the five 
days after the attacks are displayed in Table 2. In addition, 
Table 2 shows the results obtained from pooling the data over 
the entire benchmark period.32 This coefficient on receipts is a 
good estimate of the reaction function’s slope for large 
payments, and we label the coefficient estimate the slope. The 
slope of the reaction function represents a bank’s marginal 
propensity to send out payments in response to the receipt of 
payments from its counterparties. 
For the benchmark period, the slope is positive, as expected, 
and has a very precisely estimated value of 0.765. This relatively 
steep slope implies that banks have achieved a high degree of 
coordination in their payments activities. At the same time, the 
steep slope of the reaction function displays strong strategic 
complementarity among the banks’ desired actions, implying 
potentially large effects of a breakdown in coordination. 
Adding the time dummies for the afternoon period—to 
capture institutional or long-run patterns of payments 
behavior—reduces the size of the coefficient marginally to 
0.632 (Table 2).
In contrast, the reaction function slope drops considerably 
for the first four days after the attacks. The slope is estimated 
precisely enough for each day that the decline is statistically 
significant: the estimates on those days are lower than the 
benchmark estimate. We also estimated the coefficients 
individually for the five business days before September 11 to 
assess the variability in the reaction function slope within the 
benchmark period. Chart 5 plots these results along with the 
estimates from the nine business days after the attacks. This 
shows that the average from the benchmark period accurately 
captures the daily behavior in the days before the attacks. 
Furthermore, in the week after the attacks, we find that the 
slope of the reaction function increased above the benchmark 
level.
The pooling of data across banks assumes symmetry of 
reaction functions. We also estimated individual bank reaction 
functions. The results of these estimations are very similar to 
those of the pooled estimation. The weighted average of the 
slopes of the reaction is similar in size and follows the same 
pattern of a sharp dip below the benchmark estimate in the 
four days following the attacks and a move above the 
benchmark estimate in the week of September 17. These 
Table 2
Reaction Function Slopes
Benchmark September 11, 2001 September 12, 2001 September 13, 2001 September 14, 2001 September 17, 2001
Panel A: Estimates of the Coefficient on Receipts of the Pooled Model
Reaction function slope 0.765 0.229 0.358 0.199 0.599 1.190
(0.0023) (0.0528) (0.0379) (0.0419) (0.0394) (0.0312)
Panel B:  Estimates of the Coefficient on Receipts of the Pooled Model Including Afternoon Time Dummies
Reaction function slope 0.632 0.202 0.249 0.083 0.466 0.863
(0.0027) (0.0534) (0.0389) (0.0455) (0.0402) (0.0343)
Sources: Wholesale Payments Product Office; Federal Reserve Bank of New York Credit Risk Management Function.
Notes: The number of observations is 2,259,920 for the benchmark and 27,920 for each day listed. Standard errors are in parentheses.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 69
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individual-bank estimates yield another insight, namely, that 
the standard deviation of the estimated slope of the reaction 
function across banks was significantly elevated throughout the 
period of September 11-14, indicating that banks’ actions were 
highly uncoordinated during that whole period and only began 
to return to a coordinated set of reactions on September 17.
These results imply that the coordinating equilibrium in the 
payments flows on Fedwire was greatly disrupted by the events 
of September 11. In particular, we estimate that the slope of the 
reaction function fell significantly in the four days immediately 
after the attacks, indicating that to make a given value of 
payments, banks held higher balances at the Federal Reserve. 
This shows the tendency of localized problems in the payments 
system to spill over to the whole system by the presence of 
strategic complementarity.
There are at least two interpretations of these results. One is 
that the increase in the disorder of payments receipts by banks 
caused a change in the expectations of those banks to receive 
funds in the normal pattern, and so they experienced an 
increase in precautionary demands for balances. Consistent 
with this interpretation, payments activity occurred later in the 
day and in a more variable pattern than usual, and banks did 
hold much higher balances. Furthermore, although the 
communications infrastructure problems were overcome 
gradually and were largely resolved by Friday the fourteenth, 
the disorder in payments persisted on Friday and the high 
balances were observed for several additional days. Another 
interpretation is that the physical destruction of the communi-
cations and business infrastructure made the usual process of 
payments coordination more difficult—a situation that would 
heighten the demand for precautionary balances. For example, 
if a customer requests a payment to be made on its behalf, but 
it is at its credit limit, a bank will often check with counter-
parties to determine if that customer is to receive a payment 
from a counterparty. In addition, internal communication 
within the bank takes place among credit officers and payments 
personnel to ensure that approvals are in place prior to the 
release of a payment. As communication was disrupted 
generally, these processes occurred more slowly and with 
greater difficulty. Such obstacles to making payments in a 
timely fashion would tend to result in a decrease in the slope of 
the reaction function. 
The reaction function estimates for the five business days 
starting on September 17 indicate that the system quickly 
managed to regain a coordinating equilibrium. How did the 
system manage to reestablish the coordinating equilibrium? 
One direct impetus, of course, was the resolution of techno-
logical problems at individual banks.33 However, this does not 
necessarily explain the timing of the increase in the reaction 
function slope estimate, or its higher level (compared with the 
benchmark) in the week of September 17-21. For a possible 
explanation of this pattern, we now turn to the actions of the 
Federal Reserve System.
The Actions of the 
Federal Reserve System
The Federal Reserve System took a number of steps to address 
the problems in the payments system after September 11, 2001. 
Around noon on the eleventh, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System released a statement saying, “the 
Federal Reserve System is open and operating. The discount 
window is available to meet liquidity needs.”34 In addition, for 
the period from Tuesday, September 11, through Friday, 
September 21, it waived daylight overdraft fees and overnight 
[Our results show] the tendency of 
localized problems in the payments 
system to spill over to the whole system 
by the presence of strategic 
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overdraft penalties.35 (These actions significantly increased 
banks’ account balances at the Federal Reserve, as shown in 
Table 1.) Coleman (2002) provides a useful summary of the 
Federal Reserve’s actions for those four days:
“Peak and average daylight overdrafts that depository 
institutions incurred were approximately 36 and 
32 percent higher, respectively, than levels in August 
2001” (p. 81).
“Overnight overdrafts increased from an average of 
$9 million in August 2001 to more than $4 billion on 
September 12 (and the penalty fee was waived on 
overnight overdrafts). Discount window loans rose
from around $200 million to about $45 billion on 
September 12; later, when markets began to function 
better, Federal Reserve open market operations increased 
from $25 billion to nearly $100 billion” (p. 82).
Federal Reserve staff also contacted banks often during 
September 11-13, encouraging them to make payments and to 
consider use of the discount window to cover unexpected 
shortfalls that the banks might encounter later in the day. The 
assurance provided by the Federal Reserve’s press release and 
the statements of discount window officials to banks may 
have prevented a difficult situation from becoming worse. 
Once banks’ demands for liquidity had been met at low cost 
and their need to rely on incoming payments had been 
reduced, banks could once again send payments in more 
normal patterns. The return to an earlier average payments 
time on September 14 (Chart 3) indicates that banks were 
sending payments more freely early in the day compared with 
the previous two days. Our reaction function slope estimates 
also point to a return to more strategic complementarity in 
payments activity on the fourteenth. 
In the following week of September 17-21, the Federal 
Reserve, through open market operations, maintained 
significant additional liquidity in banks’ accounts, with the 
fed funds rate trading below the target interest rate. During 
that week, the data suggest that coordination reached 
higher-than-normal levels, as measured by the steepened 
slopes of the reaction functions. This is likely a consequence 
of the low cost of liquidity from overnight balances at the 
Federal Reserve. Conditions for greater-than-normal flows 
were present with a low cost of overnight balances, no 
lingering credit problems at banks, and a backlog of 
payments at banks to be processed.
Our results, combined with the actions of the Federal 
Reserve System, can be understood with the assistance of 
Chart 6. The upper left panel shows the normal (benchmark 
period) reaction functions of two representative banks, Bank A 
and Bank B (using hypothetical data that are consistent with 
the data and estimates of our model). The intercept of the 
reaction function represents a bank’s autonomous willingness 
to send payments, even if it receives no payments from other 
banks. The intercept also depends on a bank’s opening 
balances. The upward slope of the reaction function is 
consistent with the strategic complementarity present in the 
reaction functions we estimated.
The upper left panel shows a second set of reaction 
functions illustrating the effect of an interruption of Bank B’s 
ability to send payments in response to receiving a payment 
from Bank A. In this set, Bank B is unable to send out payments 
until the end of the day. As shown in the chart, Bank B has 
received many payments, leading to a high balance in its 
account. Bank A, in contrast, has a low balance and a reduced 
autonomous willingness to send payments. 
The upper right panel shows the set of reaction functions 
immediately following Bank B’s recovered ability to respond to 
Bank A. In response to Bank B’s previous inability to react to a 
payment, Bank A has lowered its expectations of receiving 
further payments. This lowers Bank A’s willingness to send out 
payments in a coordinated fashion. Thus, payments activity is 
at a low level despite the relatively steep slope of Bank B’s 
reaction function.
The lower left panel shows the effects of liquidity injections 
by the Federal Reserve System. The increase in balances raises 
the banks’ autonomous willingness to send payments and 
results in an increase in payments value and in turnover.
Finally, in the lower right panel, the banks’ coordination 
increases further while the liquidity supplied by the Federal 
Reserve remains in the System. This panel represents the 
situation during the week of September 17-21. The combined 
effects led to higher values of payments and payments 
coordination, as observed in the Fedwire activity that week.
Once banks’ demands for liquidity had 
been met at low cost and their need to 
rely on incoming payments had been 
reduced, banks could once again send 
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The Federal Reserve Response
From the point of view of the strategic models of payments 
timing and submission discussed earlier, the actions of the 
Federal Reserve System to provide liquidity to the banking 
system following the attacks of September 11 were appropriate. 
The Federal Reserve acted to provide liquidity to banks—
liquidity that many banks would have expected to receive 
under more normal circumstances in the form of incoming 
payments or via fed funds borrowing. 
But precisely how effective were the actions of the Federal 
Reserve in restarting the coordination of payments activity? 
That question is difficult to resolve. One way we can try to 
determine the efficacy of the Federal Reserve’s discount 
window lending is by examining how much less concentrated 
balances at the Federal Reserve were after discount window 72 Liquidity Effects of the Events of September 11, 2001
loans were made. We can determine this difference by 
revisiting the HHI of account balances and comparing it with 
the concentration of account balances with the discount 
window loans removed. The discount window loans not only 
provided a high level of liquidity, but were distributed in such 
a way as to decrease the concentration of balances. We calcu-
lated that the discount window lending led to a distribution of 
balances across banks that was 8 percent less concentrated (as 
measured by the HHI) on September 11, and 9 percent less 
concentrated on the twelfth than the balances would have been 
if discount window lending had not taken place.
The redistribution of balances and the injection of new 
balances via the discount window are consistent with the 
interpretation that the loans allowed banks to carry out 
payments. By assuring banks that the discount window was 
available and by waiving daylight overdraft fees, the Federal 
Reserve’s actions tended to eliminate the strategic elements of 
the timing and submission of payments.
We argue that the Federal Reserve System’s actions were 
likely effective in facilitating payments during the period of 
technical disruption and in affecting banks’ abilities to make 
and coordinate payments. It is important to note that the 
Federal Reserve System’s injections of liquidity, and other 
actions urging banks to make payments, did not resolve the 
physical problems that banks had in communicating or 
accessing customer records. Instead, they were aimed at 
affecting the behavior of banks that were grappling with 
both the technical difficulties and their resulting liquidity 
problems. 
The Discount Window, Open Market 
Operations, and the Coordinator
of Last Resort 
The Federal Reserve System injected liquidity, primarily 
through open market operations, in the period starting on 
September 13. On that day, the Federal Reserve advanced 
banks a much smaller amount in discount window loans
(but still far more than average), and on September 14, its 
discount window lending was at a normal level. On those same 
days, the Federal Reserve injected a large amount of liquidity 
via open market operations.
The switch from primarily using the discount window to 
relying more on open market operations and the fed funds 
market occurred after some of the major technical disruptions 
were resolved, communications improved, and more normal 
patterns of coordination in payments activity had begun to be 
reestablished. Without a fully operating fed funds market, open 
market operations are unlikely to be effective (relative to the 
use of the discount window) in channeling funds to the 
institutions that need funds to send payments. Another factor 
that distinguishes the discount window as a means of injecting 
liquidity is that it is available to banks upon their request. 
Under this facility, Federal Reserve Banks may make credit 
available to depository institutions by providing advances 
secured by acceptable collateral or by discounting paper that 
meets the requirements of the Federal Reserve Act (see Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [2002] for more 
discussion of the discount window). In contrast, open market 
operations are made at the discretion of the central bank, and 
the liquidity that is injected must typically be redistributed to 
reach a particular bank’s account.
Even when the fed funds infrastructure is fully intact, there 
are reasons to believe that the interbank market will perform 
poorly when payments are uncoordinated.36 As we have seen, 
such situations lead to a generally increased demand for 
balances. Banks that are reluctant to pay one another are also 
likely to be reluctant to lend to one another. In these cases, 
injecting funds through open market operations may not be 
effective because the funds may not be circulated to the 
particular banks that most need liquidity. Discount window 
operations may be more effective in reestablishing coordina-
tion, but once coordination has largely been reestablished, 
open market operations are, in general, preferable because the 
operation of the fed funds market can be expected to distribute 
balances in an efficient way.
It is notable that much of the recent literature on the 
discount window, such as Schwartz (1992), Goodfriend and 
King (1988), and Furfine (2000), either overlook this motive 
for the use of the discount window or dismiss it in their 
evaluations as probably unnecessary (for an alternative view, 
see Martin [2002]). In all three articles, the authors assume that 
payments coordination is not an issue. Furthermore, the 
authors assume that the fed funds market, combined with open 
market operations, can provide and direct adequate liquidity to 
The discount window loans not only 
provided a high level of liquidity, but were 
distributed in such a way as to decrease 
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the banking system. Neither of these assumptions is one that 
can be made for all feasible circumstances.
In general, no single private bank can appropriate all of the 
spillover public benefit of the coordination, so the incentive to 
reestablish coordination by borrowing at the target funds rate 
is likely to be too low relative to the social optimum. Therefore, 
the central bank is in a unique position to assist banks in 
recoordinating payments. That the Federal Reserve waived 
daylight overdraft fees and penalty fees on overnight overdrafts 
and assured banks that liquidity was available from the 
discount window is consistent with providing liquidity at rates 
that take into account the social benefits of payments 
coordination. In its role as “coordinator of last resort,” the 
central bank might use either open market operations to inject 
funds (as long as the interbank market is functioning well) in 
sufficient amounts for the interbank rate to trade at a discount 
to the target rate, or it might use the discount window.
In their September 17, 2001, statement in which they 
lowered the fed funds target rate and the discount rate, the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and the Federal 
Reserve Board announced, “the Federal Reserve will continue 
to supply unusually large volumes of liquidity to the financial 
markets, as needed, until more normal market functioning is 
restored. As a consequence, the FOMC recognizes that the 
actual federal funds rate may be below its target on occasion in 
these unusual circumstances.”37
Historically, the discount rate has been set below the target 
funds rate.38 The important point from the coordination-of-
payments perspective is that the Federal Reserve can capture 
some of the public benefit from reestablishing the coordination 
equilibrium.39 For example, once coordination is reestab-
lished, the number of intraday overdrafts declines, reducing 
the risk taken on by the Fed.
Payments System Infrastructure and Design
It is worthwhile to ask if central banks could make changes to 
the operation of payments systems that would prevent or 
attenuate problems that tend to disrupt the coordination of 
payments timing. An important change that market 
participants and financial system regulators are actively 
pursuing is to work to safeguard the physical infrastructure 
used in the payments system. The Federal Reserve, along with 
other financial system regulators, has pursued this approach 
in the recent “Draft Interagency White Paper on Sound 
Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial 
System.” In that paper, the regulators identify sound practices 
to strengthen the U.S. financial system’s resilience. These 
practices include, among others, a practice for firms that play 
significant roles in critical markets to “maintain sufficient 
out-of-region resources to meet recovery and resumption 
objectives.” 
In addition to these fundamental changes in the payments 
infrastructure, there could also be changes in the protocols for 
submission and settlement of payments. These changes might 
occur in ways that would either assist banks in maintaining or 
reestablishing coordination in the case of an interruption to the 
normal patterns of payments flows, or might reduce the 
reliance of banks on payments coordination for liquidity 
purposes altogether. For example, McAndrews and Rajan 
(2000) review a number of options to improve the coordi-
nation of payments in the normal course of events, such as 
offering zero-cost overdraft privileges during specified times 
every day to encourage banks to submit payments during those 
times. Such an approach might be useful in providing a more 
targeted focal point to reestablish coordination of payments, 
but it does not reduce the likelihood of a coordination failure.
Alternatively, the payments system could be designed to 
eliminate the strategic elements of timing and submission of 
payments altogether. Several options are possible. One option 
is to implement new “hybrid” payments systems—an example 
of which is the new CHIPS system in the United States—that 
seek to lessen the motive for timing payments to save on 
liquidity costs.40 Pure netting systems accomplish this as well, 
but at the cost of delays in payments settlement until the 
designated time and also at the cost of creating intraday credit 
exposures that remain outstanding until settlement. It is 
generally agreed that deferred net settlement systems cannot 
accommodate the requirements of modern financial systems, 
which require intraday finality of payments, or the settlement 
of payments throughout the day.
Discount window operations may be more 
effective in reestablishing coordination, 
but once coordination has largely been 
reestablished, open market operations 
are . . . preferable because the operation 
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The hybrid payments systems offer an alternative in that 
they allow for some subset of the payments to be settled during 
the day, while some other subset remains in a queue of 
payments awaiting settlement. Various possibilities for settling 
payments from the queue are possible, but they tend to share 
a key feature, which is that a bank is strictly better off 
submitting payments to the queue than delaying a submission 
until it receives a payment from another bank. Typically, the 
operator of the payments system can search the queue for 
offsetting payments. A bank is then better off submitting its 
payments to the queue because by doing so, the bank makes 
the settlement of the payment contingent on the receipt of an 
offsetting payment. Such a system, therefore, offers the 
possibility that a bank will submit payments to the queue early 
in the day, letting the operator of the queue management 
system release that bank’s payments when messages of 
received payments arrive.
It is worth investigating whether such systems, if imple-
mented, would operate well in distributing liquidity and in 
encouraging the submission of payments, even if one bank 
were unable to send out payments.41, 42 These systems typically 
have been considered a means for banks to economize on 
liquidity usage (while achieving intraday settlement of 
payments) during normal operations. Given the magnitude of 
the physical disruptions experienced on September 11, 2001, it 
is now clear that an important consideration in the design of a 
payments system is how that system would perform under such 
extreme circumstances.
Conclusion
Over the years, the interdependency of payments has become 
more important and prominent in large U.S. dollar payments 
for two reasons. First, the turnover on Fedwire has been 
increasing for years, highlighting the importance of incoming 
funds as a source of liquidity for payments, and thus creating 
greater demand for coordination. Second, the level of the 
concentration of payments has been rising, increasing the 
ability of the relatively unconcentrated payments providers to 
coordinate their activities. As coordination has become more 
important for the normal functioning of the payments system, 
the breakdown of coordination has become more problematic 
in that the demands for liquidity balloon as the coordinating 
equilibrium fails.
In this article, we have shown how the Federal Reserve 
System acted to restore payments coordination through 
especially high levels of discount window and intraday lending 
on September 11 and 12. As communications improved, the 
Federal Reserve was able to meet more of the market’s needs for 
liquidity through open market operations, allowing the fed 
funds market to distribute that liquidity. We have also argued 
that because of the social benefit of reestablishing the payments 
coordination equilibrium, the injection of funds into the U.S. 
payments system was important in overcoming the breakdown 
of the equilibrium in payments coordination. Going forward, 
it is likely that the discount window will continue to provide an 
important way for the Federal Reserve to direct liquidity to 
banks and to improve the coordination of payments in periods 
of severe disorder in the pattern of those payments.Endnotes
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1. Fedwire is a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) payments system. In 
such systems, payments are executed and finalized very shortly after 
they are communicated by the originating bank to the system operator 
and after the system operator communicates the payments details to 
the receiving bank.
2. See Bank for International Settlements (1997, p. 22) for a similar set 
of sources of funding. In this article, we refer to “liquidity” as the 
ability of banks—whose balance sheets often consist of loans and 
other assets that may be difficult to sell in the short run—to make 
outgoing payments immediately. As a result, liquidity is a more 
general concept than “funds in a central bank account.” It includes the 
expected behavior of other participants in the payments and banking 
markets, and arises as part of an equilibrium of behavior of the market 
participants.
3. Service-related balances are primarily made up of required clearing 
balances, which banks establish to conduct payments operations via 
Fedwire when their reserve balances are too low to accommodate their 
payments needs. See Stevens (1993) for a description of required 
clearing balances.
4. As these values trend upward with growth in economic and 
financial activity, August 2001 is used as an example of recent activity 
prior to the period of interest. See Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (2001c,  p. A5, Table 1.11, lines 22 and 25).
5. An exception to this rule should be noted: required clearing 
balances earn credits that can be used to offset fees charged by the 
Federal Reserve System for its priced services. See Stevens (1993) for
a more complete discussion.
6. As explained by Furfine (1999), such a large amount of lending is 
possible, given the much lower balances available to lend, by banks 
acting as both borrowers and lenders on the same day in the fed funds 
market on a regular basis.
7. There is a third possibility, previously mentioned: the bank can run 
an “overnight overdraft” for which it pays a 4-percentage-point 
penalty above the effective federal funds rate for that day. 
8. See Coleman (2002, p. A6, Table 1.12, line 8).
9. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2002) for 
the recent proposal regarding the discount window. 
10. See Coleman (2002) for an extensive discussion of the Federal 
Reserve’s intraday credit policies and operations. Not all banks can 
borrow intraday from the Fed, and the borrowing of any particular 
bank is subject to a limit on the amounts that can be borrowed. The 
Fed guarantees payment of funds transfers across Fedwire, so if a bank 
has a negative balance in its account and is within its borrowing limit, 
the Fed transfers the funds to the receiving bank, effectively lending 
the “daylight overdraft” to the bank that originated the payment.
11. See Coleman (2002, p. 82, Table 8).
12. The turnover ratio has increased in recent decades, both in the 
United States and abroad. See, for example, Bank for International 
Settlements (1997).
13. See, for example, Angelini (1998), Bech and Garratt 
(forthcoming), and Kobayakawa (1997).
14. See Bulow et al. (1985) for a general description of strategic 
complementarity. Strategic complementarity is indicative of 
situations in which agents’ payoffs increase with the degree of 
coordination with other players.
15. Of course, in a deferred (or designated-time) net settlement 
payments system, offsetting payments made at different times are 
cumulated and offset at the time designated for settlement. Another 
way banks can use incoming funds for payments in an RTGS system is 
by using “throughput guidelines,” which require banks to submit 
certain percentages of the payments the banks make for the whole day 
by specified times during the day. Such throughput requirements can 
regulate the rate of turnover of account balances and are in use in the 
United Kingdom’s RTGS system, the Clearing House Automated 
Payments System (CHAPS). Throughput requirements are agreed 
upon by all system members and therefore might be interpreted as a 
cooperative means of coordinating payments flows.
16. McAndrews and Rajan (2000) present evidence consistent with 
this hypothesis for Fedwire payments activity. 
17. On this point, see Angelini (2000), Kahn and Roberds (1998), and 
Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (forthcoming).
18. Once again, an equilibrium of payments submissions may result in 
a delayed (relative to the case in which there is no risk of default by the 
counterparty), but simultaneous, submission of payments.76 Liquidity Effects of the Events of September 11, 2001 
Endnotes (Continued)
19. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of the deposits of the banks. It can vary from 0 to 10,000, 
with 10,000 indicating that a single bank holds all of the deposits. For 
example, a level of 5,000 corresponds to a symmetric duopoly in 
deposit holdings and a level of 3,333 corresponds to a symmetric 
triopoly.
20. Specifically, the netting ratio over the period from   to   is 
defined as:
                      ,
where   represents the value of the payment from bank i to bank j in 
time period t.
21. The example captures many features of the situation under review. 
For example, although a bank can generally make a payment if its 
balance at the Federal Reserve is zero (by borrowing from the Federal 
Reserve via a daylight overdraft), this is a costly way of making a 
payment if the bank is expecting other payments to arrive. It is also 
risky to make a payment by borrowing while awaiting the arrival of 
other payments because if the other payments were not to arrive, then 
the bank could incur the substantial penalty of an overnight overdraft. 
As a result, the failure of an expected payment to arrive can cause 
another bank to delay sending its payments, which are expected by yet 
other banks, in turn causing them to delay their payments, and so on. 
This multiplier effect of the original delay can cause all other banks in 
the system to demand liquidity. 
22. The Financial Times, on September 21, 2001, reported that the 
Bank of New York was the hardest-hit bank because its two principal 
locations are in Lower Manhattan.
23. Fedwire’s operations were uninterrupted on September 11 and 
thereafter.
24. One of these estimates is gathered by the Markets Group of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in its daily survey of fed funds 
brokers. The other estimate was made by the authors, using a method 
suggested by Furfine (1999). His method consists of systematically 
culling all large interbank payments from the records of all Fedwire 































that the selected payment’s values must be at least $1 million and be 
made in increments of $100,000. In addition, each selected payment 
must match a payment made the following banking day in the reverse 
direction, and whose value exceeds the selected payment by an 
amount that would closely correspond to the interest that would be 
expected given the range of reported fed funds interest rates for that 
day.
25. The benchmark data set includes one day for each ten-day 
maintenance period from May 1999 to August 2001. In addition, we 
include the weeks of September 4, 2001, to September 10, 2001, and 
September 24, 2001, to November 28, 2001, for 107 days in all. The 
remaining data from September 11, 2001, to September 21, 2001, are 
used for a detailed analysis of activity on Fedwire on the day of the 
attacks and the eight business days thereafter.
26. If a large proportion of the balances in the banking system 
concentrate in one bank’s account, then other banks will face, all else 
being equal, higher costs of making payments, or alternatively may 
face liquidity constraints on their borrowing, which could preclude 
their submission of further payments. As shown in Exhibit 2, we use 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to measure concentration of 
balances in Federal Reserve accounts.
27. Fedwire hours of operation were extended during the first week 
following the attacks; Fedwire’s usual closing is 6:30 p.m.
28. Coleman (2002) reports that daylight overdrafts increased from 
their August 2001 average of $32.8 billion to $45 billion on 
September 11, $36 billion on the twelfth, $41 billion on the thirteenth, 
and $54 billion on the fourteenth.
29. Other formulations, more directly comparable with the exact form 
of the best-reply function of Bech and Garratt (forthcoming), were 
tested, such as estimating a bank’s outgoing payments in response to 
all other banks’ outgoing payments. Similar qualitative results were 
obtained from those formulations.
30. We estimated this model using receipts both from other banks’ 
funds transfers, as well as the settlement of sales of a bank’s 
government and agency securities, which are also settled via Fedwire. 
Including these receipts in the estimation had very little effect on the 
estimates on receipts from other banks’ funds transfers and the other 
variables in the model.Endnotes (Continued)
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31. Few banks make payments in the early morning hours. Banks may 
make “settlement” payments to other banks after 6:00 p.m., but not 
payments on behalf of customers. Dummy variables for the other days 
of the reserve maintenance periods were included in other 
estimations, but were not significant.
32. It should be noted that the results are robust with respect to the 
exact times over which one measures outgoing payments and receipts.
33. The Bank of New York (2001) issued a press release on 
September 14 announcing that “virtually all of its systems are 
up and running.”
34. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2001a).
35. The Federal Reserve System announced the waiving of daylight 
overdraft fees via a Fedwire broadcast message on Friday, 
September 14.
36. In Europe, where no attacks or technological problems occurred, 
there was, nonetheless, significantly higher demand for liquidity on 
September 12, indicated by a spike in interest rates on overnight 
interbank loans. The European Central Bank supplied an 
extraordinary amount of liquidity on September 12 and 13. See 
Bindseil et al. (2002) for a more complete discussion.
37.  See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2001b). 
38. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2002) for 
the Board’s May 17 proposal to change discount window lending 
policies to set the discount rate higher than the target fed funds rate. 
39. The public benefit to higher coordination of payments includes 
the lower cost of payments, as banks can hold lower overnight 
balances to complete expected payments, which reduces the 
“inflation tax” to which the public is subject for holding currency or 
noninterest-bearing balances at the central bank. In addition, banks 
are subject to either less risk or a shorter duration of risk exposure 
from their counterparties.
40. McAndrews and Trundle (2001) and Bech and Soramäki (2001) 
describe various hybrid systems.
41. One area of interesting research would be to examine the 
performance of CHIPS relative to Fedwire following the terrorist 
attacks.
42. In the United States, for example, many banks can choose between 
Fedwire and CHIPS to make payments. A simulation analysis of the 
effects of infrastructure disruptions in a payments system is presented 
in Bech and Soramäki (2002).References
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